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Morris M. Kleiner
Border Battles
The Infl uence of Occupational Licensing 
on Interstate Migration
Figure 1  Occupational Licensing and Interstate Migration, 1950–2008
SOURCE: Johnson and Kleiner (2015).
“Mobility . . . is basic to any guarantee of 
freedom of opportunity. The result would be 
a substantial dilution of the rights of national 
citizenship, a serious impairment of the 
principles of equality. Since the state statute 
here . . . involved such consequences, it runs 
afoul of the privileges and immunities clause 
of the Fourteenth Amendment.” –Edwards v. 
California (1941) 
This quote from the U.S. Supreme 
Court decision in Edwards v. California 
focuses on the issue of whether states 
can establish monetary barriers to restrict 
citizens moving across state boundaries 
to pursue making a living. The Court 
also has noted in several decisions 
that “the right to move freely in search 
of economic betterment is a mark of 
national citizenship and fundamental in 
our system of constitutional guarantees” 
(Roback 1943). This article examines 
one such potential barrier—occupational 
licensing—to learn whether it restricts 
migration across state borders. To the 
extent that it does, I propose policy 
recommendations to minimize these 
barriers in order for individuals to be 
able to work in government-regulated 
occupations.
Occupational licensure, the legal 
process establishing qualifi cations to 
practice a trade or profession, has become 
one of the most signifi cant labor market 
regulations in the United States. The 
percent of the workforce licensed at the 
state level grew from around 5 percent 
in the 1950s to almost 23 percent in 
2008, with a 28 percent increase since 
1980 (Kleiner and Krueger 2013). At the 
same time, migration rates within the 
United States have fallen dramatically, 
with a decline of 50 percent in the gross 
fl ow of people across states over the last 
20 years (Kaplan and Shulhofer-Wohl 
2015). Figure 1 shows the growth in 
occupational licensing coverage of the 
workforce and the decline in interstate 
migration rates. During this early period, 
gross interstate migration was about 3.5 
percent, but by 2014 it had declined to 
1.5 percent, with the most rapid decline 
following 1985 (Molloy, Smith, and 
Wozniak 2011). To what extent has 
the growth in occupational licensing 
coverage of the workforce contributed to 
the decline? 
Analysis of Occupational Licensing 
and Interstate Migration
The study of licensing and interstate 
migration has a well-developed history in 
policy analysis. Holen (1965) examines 
the relationship between state licensing 
arrangements and professional practices 
(specifi cally medicine, dentistry, and 
law) and how it affects interstate mobility 
and the allocation of professional labor 
resources. She fi nds that the empirical 
evidence is consistent with the hypothesis 
that professional licensing arrangements 
and practices in dentistry and law restrict 
interstate mobility among dentists and 
lawyers and distort the allocation of 
professional personnel in these fi elds. In 
a follow-up analysis, similar to Pashigian 
(1979), Kleiner, Gay, and Greene (1982) 
fi nd that restrictive licensing may 
operate as a barrier to mobility, causing 
a misallocation of labor resources across 
U.S. states, with increased earnings for 
the practitioners in those states with the 
most restrictive barriers. These barriers 
may reduce the ability of the labor market 
to most effi ciently allocate its human 
capital resources. 
More recently, Federman, Harrington, 
and Krynski (2006) estimate the effects 
of licensing regulations on the entry 
of manicurist immigrants into the 
occupation in the United States. This is 
the fi rst analytical study that examines 
the links between licensing and the 
migration patterns in a low-skilled 
occupation. Their fi ndings show that 
the level of migration is infl uenced by 
the existence and restrictiveness (in 
terms of minimum entry standards) of 
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state licensing regulations. In particular, 
they estimate that the requirement to 
have an additional 100 hours of training 
reduces by 4.5 percent the likelihood 
of having a Vietnamese manicurist, 
while states requiring some level of 
English profi ciency were 5.7 percentage 
points less likely to have a Vietnamese 
manicurist. 
DePasquale and Stange (2014) 
examine the infl uence of the nurses’ 
compact on mobility. The Nurse 
Licensure Compact, introduced in 1999, 
was created with the intent to provide 
greater mobility for nurses. It allows 
registered nurses and licensed practical 
nurses with licenses in one compact 
member state to practice in other states 
without obtaining a separate license. 
The authors fi nd that nurses that live 
in a border metropolitan statistical area 
that crosses multiple state lines see a 
1.2 percentage point increase in the 
probability of living in one state and 
working in another following their home 
state joining the compact. The authors 
also fi nd that the reduction of licensing 
barriers on cross-state mobility appears to 
widen the geographic reach of the nurse 
labor market.
Johnson and Kleiner’s (2015) 
more comprehensive analysis of fi ve 
universally licensed occupations shows 
that, after controlling for demographic 
characteristics, individuals in these 
regulated occupations have lower 
interstate migration rates than their peers 
in other occupations, while the rate at 
which they move within states is similar. 
To establish whether or not licensing 
is behind these differences, the authors 
perform a difference-in-difference 
analysis using changes in state licensing 
laws. State policies on accepting those 
who fulfi ll licensing requirements in 
other states as qualifi ed to practice in 
their state (called endorsement) and on 
forming agreements with other states 
on establishing licensing requirements 
(called reciprocity) are amended often. 
For example, for lawyers, Johnson 
and Kleiner fi nd that states that adopt 
these more fl exible policies have higher 
migration rates compared to states with 
no such policies. They fi nd that for these 
fi ve universally licensed occupations, the 
additional costs placed on migration have 
restricted the movement of individuals 
in licensed occupations, accounting for 
part of the decrease in overall migration 
within the United States.  
Taken together, these studies on 
interstate migration support the view 
that regulation may limit the number 
of practitioners in a country and that a 
policy of reducing barriers to interstate 
migration would provide benefi ts to 
workers and consumers. The ability 
to move across state lines with fewer 
impediments and have permission to 
work would allow individuals to more 
easily go to where there are jobs. This is 
particularly important because the growth 
in wage variation may make it more 
advantageous to move across state lines 
(Moretti 2012). 
From Research to Policy 
In a 2011 executive report, the Obama 
administration highlights the obstacles 
that occupational licensure regimes place 
on military spouses’ careers when they 
move from state to state. In particular, 
the report lists as a priority developing 
“career and educational opportunities 
for military spouses . . . by reducing 
barriers to employment and services due 
to different state policies and standards” 
(U.S. Department of the Treasury and 
U.S. Department of Defense 2012). 
This issue continues to be a topic of 
discussion for the Joint Forces task force, 
an initiative led by Michelle Obama and 
Jill Biden to improve wellness, education, 
and employment opportunities for 
veterans and their families. 
Some of the greatest variations in 
occupational licensing requirements 
infl uence teachers. For example, all 50 
states and the District of Columbia have 
some sort of reciprocity or endorsement 
scheme for out-of-state teaching 
applicants. Within each category, 
though, the degree of reciprocity and 
endorsement can vary immensely. For 
example, Maine endorses an out-of-state 
applicant for licensure who has taught 
for fi ve of the last seven years as long as 
she has gone through a state-approved 
education program in another state. In 
North Carolina, an out-of-state teacher 
with the same amount of experience 
must be “highly qualifi ed” in his 
current state and meet North Carolina 
exam requirements or have National 
Board Certifi cation to be eligible for 
endorsement (Public Schools of North 
Carolina 2002).
The following commentary from 
a public school teacher illustrates the 
infl uence of interstate regulations on 
potential migrants’ ability to move across 
state lines: “I had reciprocity in New 
Mexico from Louisiana, no problem. 
Now, I am moving to Illinois and having 
to test all over again. I’ve tried applying 
online to public schools, and they won’t 
even let you submit without a license and 
have strongly worded warnings about 
contacting schools directly” (Arbury et 
al. 2015, p. 26). 
Another illustration of the “border 
battle” comes from a high school 
principal: “It would be great if Minnesota 
and Wisconsin would have some sort 
of reciprocity agreement. I work in a 
border town, and we get a lot of qualifi ed 
applicants from across the river. We can’t 
keep them though, they have to go back 
to their state after their student teaching 
is over. I also think this pool of teachers 
could also fi ll content gaps” (Arbury et 
al. 2015, p. 27).
Policy Changes
Based on the legal and economic 
issues presented, state licensing standards 
should allow individuals to move 
across state lines with minimal costs for 
retraining or residency requirements. 
Restrictive licensing may 
operate as a barrier to mobility, 
causing a misallocation of labor 
resources across U.S. states.
When licensing is deemed 
to be in the public interest, 
weighed against the economic
costs, states and localities 
should accept licenses 
granted by other states.
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When licensing is deemed to be in the 
public interest, weighed against the 
economic costs, states and localities 
should accept, as much as possible, 
licenses granted by other states. The 
Nurse Licensure Compact mentioned 
earlier is one example: all states 
party to the compact have agreed to 
accept nursing licensure applicants 
from the other party states without 
additional requirements. In the case of 
endorsement, a state will accept out-of-
state applicants as long as the origin state 
has substantially equivalent licensure 
standards as the destination state 
(DePasquale and Stange 2014). 
Recognition of occupational licenses 
across states may not benefi t all licensed 
workers equally. For example, the 
decision to move often depends on 
both age and education, with younger 
and more-educated workers usually 
having the most to gain from migration. 
Calls to reduce occupational licensing 
barriers to interstate mobility have 
come from the executive branch of the 
federal government, including the U.S. 
Department of the Treasury and the 
U.S. Department of Defense (2012). 
The executive branch has made these 
policy recommendations because, owing 
to variations in state licensing laws, the 
families of some military personnel have 
had a diffi cult time pursuing their careers 
as they move between states. Recently 
proposed policy would more fully 
implement what the U.S. Supreme Court 
deemed crucial in Edwards v. California 
(1941): “mobility . . . is basic to any 
guarantee of freedom of opportunity.”
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